The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Tianjin was meant to showcase multilateralism and dialogue among Eurasian powers. Instead, it has become the latest flashpoint in the widening rift between Washington and New Delhi.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s presence alongside Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping prompted a fresh barrage of criticism from the Trump administration, led by trade adviser Peter Navarro. His remarks, blunt even by Washington standards, underscored how the United States continues to publicly attack India for refusing to yield to American pressure on Russia and trade.
Navarro, in a characteristically acerbic briefing, described it as a “shame” that Modi, leader of the world’s largest democracy, had chosen to share a stage with “the two biggest authoritarian dictators.” He accused India of funding Russia’s war in Ukraine by buying discounted crude oil and reselling it at a profit, even reaching for incendiary rhetoric on domestic caste lines by alleging that “Brahmins are profiteering at the expense of the Indian people.”
This was not an isolated statement but part of a steady escalation. Navarro has repeatedly framed the conflict as “Modi’s war,” branded India as the “Kremlin’s laundromat,” and sought to portray Delhi as undermining the Western alliance. The message is consistent: in Washington’s eyes, India is not doing enough to align with US strategic priorities.
The Tariff Weapon
The criticism is not just rhetorical. Earlier this year, President Trump imposed sweeping tariffs on Indian goods: 25 percent reciprocal duties for what the White House calls “unfair trade practices,” and another 25 percent explicitly linked to India’s continued energy trade with Moscow. India now faces a punitive 50 percent tariff wall, making it the only major economy subject to what the administration describes as “secondary tariffs.”
New Delhi has pushed back sharply. “Like any major economy, India will take all necessary measures to safeguard its national interests and economic security,” the Ministry of External Affairs said in a statement, terming the tariffs “unjustified and unreasonable.”
The move has backfired domestically in the US as well. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has ruled that most of Trump’s sweeping global tariffs were unlawful, while Democrats in Congress have accused the president of abusing national emergency powers.
Former National Security Adviser John Bolton has gone further, calling Trump’s trade policy “disastrous” for having undone decades of Western efforts to integrate India into a coalition counterbalancing Russia and China.
India’s Careful Calculus
India’s position is straightforward: energy security cannot be compromised. Russian crude, discounted since the G7 price cap of $60 a barrel, has become a vital source for stabilising domestic fuel prices. Prior to 2022, India imported little oil from Russia; today, Moscow is among its top suppliers. By refining Russian crude and re-exporting it to Europe and Asia, India has both supported its domestic economy and helped keep global supply chains functioning.
To Washington, this looks like profiteering. To Delhi, it is pragmatic statecraft. “We cannot dictate the terms of global energy markets. We can only act to protect our people and economy,” one senior Indian official explained privately.
On trade more broadly, India insists that its tariffs are in line with World Trade Organization rules and comparable to those of other major economies. The “Maharaja of tariffs” label coined by Navarro is seen in Delhi as both inaccurate and provocative.
A Widening Strategic Rift
What troubles policymakers in both capitals is not just the rhetoric but the growing perception gap. Washington wants India firmly in the Western camp on Ukraine and China. Delhi, while committed to deepening ties with the US on technology, defense, and critical minerals, insists on retaining strategic autonomy.
By escalating its criticism in such public and personal terms, the Trump administration risks pushing India closer to the very powers it wants New Delhi to distance itself from. Modi’s meetings with Putin and Xi at the SCO may have been routine diplomatic engagements, but under the glare of Navarro’s attacks, they have acquired sharper symbolism.
Bolton’s warning that Trump’s tariffs “shredded decades of effort” to wean India away from Moscow is already echoing in policy circles. European diplomats quietly acknowledge that while they would prefer India to cut back on Russian oil, Trump’s heavy-handed approach has made such cooperation less likely.
Alternatives and Ironies
Ironically, while the US lashes out at India, other partners are drawing closer. The United Kingdom is pushing ahead with a free trade agreement, with Parliament recently noting how tariff reductions could boost business confidence and strengthen bilateral ties. Russia and China, despite their own tensions with India, find in the current environment a reason to emphasize common cause.
The SCO summit itself highlighted this dynamic. In bilateral discussions, Modi and Xi acknowledged the stabilising role of their economies in global trade. With Putin, Modi emphasised energy cooperation. Each of these gestures was calibrated to show that India will not be strong-armed into altering its foreign policy.
The Road Ahead
For India, the challenge is balancing firmness with flexibility. Its leaders must protect national interests while avoiding outright rupture with Washington. For the US, the risk is that by framing India as an unreliable partner or, worse, an enabler of authoritarian regimes, it undermines one of the central pillars of its Indo-Pacific strategy.
Navarro’s rhetoric may be designed for domestic political audiences as much as for foreign policy signaling. Yet its impact abroad is real. When America’s trade czar describes India as “in bed with dictators,” the trust deficit grows.
Ultimately, the India-US relationship has weathered storms before—from sanctions after India’s 1998 nuclear tests to disputes at the WTO. But the current combination of punitive tariffs, public humiliation, and strategic divergence presents a new test. Whether both sides can recalibrate before lasting damage sets in will shape not just bilateral ties but the broader balance of power in Asia.
For now, India has made its choice clear: it will not be coerced.
