Operation Sindoor, India’s calibrated aerial offensive in response to the brutal Pahalgam terror attack of April 22, was one of the most complex and high-stakes military engagements in recent history. Designed as a precision airstrike against terror hubs in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), the operation began on May 7 under intense political and diplomatic constraints.
According to Captain Shiv Kumar, India’s Defence Attaché to Indonesia, who spoke at a seminar in Jakarta on June 10, India’s initial losses during the strikes were a direct result of political orders that prohibited targeting Pakistani military installations or air defences. This decision, though made with a broader strategic intent to avoid escalation, left Indian Air Force (IAF) jets vulnerable to retaliatory fire from Pakistan’s integrated air defence systems.
Captain Kumar, a senior naval officer, clarified that while he disagreed with some claims about the scale of Indian losses, he acknowledged that some aircraft were indeed lost in the initial wave. These losses prompted an immediate shift in Indian tactics. From May 8 onward, India transitioned to a SEAD/DEAD (Suppression and Destruction of Enemy Air Defences) phase, leveraging BrahMos cruise missiles and tactical drones to degrade Pakistan’s radar and air defence grid, ultimately gaining air superiority over the contested region.
Civil-Military Synergy or Strategic Hesitation?
India has always prided itself on a democratic model where military power is subordinate to civilian leadership. This distinction, emphasized by both Captain Kumar and the Indian Embassy in Indonesia, differentiates India from its neighbour, where the military often operates as a state within the state. However, as Operation Sindoor shows, strategic restraint can come at a cost.
The question that arises is not whether political leadership should guide military action—indeed, it must—but whether such guidance should restrict operational effectiveness in live combat. In this case, the government’s initial directive to avoid Pakistani military targets arguably handed a tactical edge to Pakistan in the opening hours. Pakistan claims it downed six Indian fighters, including three Rafales, a claim India contests. Still, even Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Anil Chauhan acknowledged that there were “losses” in the early stages of the operation.
Strategic Restraint versus Tactical Surprise
One of the greatest challenges in modern warfare is balancing strategic restraint with tactical effectiveness. By limiting the scope of the initial strikes, India aimed to deliver a message of deterrence without crossing the threshold into all-out war. But Pakistan, unburdened by such constraints, responded forcefully.
India’s eventual course correction—marked by bold targeting of Pakistani radar sites and air defence systems—helped restore momentum. By May 10, Indian forces had achieved substantial degradation of Pakistani military capacity in the region. As Captain Kumar noted, once the IAF began striking military installations and defences, Indian jets operated with greater ease and success, owing to superior planning and the use of advanced weaponry like the BrahMos.
The Political Optics of Air Power
The opposition Congress party quickly seized upon Captain Kumar’s remarks to criticize the Modi government’s handling of the operation. The debate now is not just about military losses but about the broader implications of how and when political decisions should influence operational planning.
The government responded by stating that Kumar’s comments were “quoted out of context,” asserting that India’s military acts under civilian control and that Operation Sindoor was a calibrated, non-escalatory mission aimed solely at terrorist infrastructure. That distinction, while technically sound, may not resonate with a public that expects decisive action in the face of terror attacks.
Strength in Strategy, But Also in Clarity
Operation Sindoor offers both pride and pause. India demonstrated restraint and responsibility by initially focusing solely on terror camps. But in warfare, clarity of objective and adaptability of strategy are equally essential. The early air losses—however few—were a reminder that moral high ground and military high ground are not always aligned.
India’s eventual success in gaining air dominance shows the remarkable competence of its armed forces, but it also highlights the need for a clear-eyed doctrine that doesn’t allow political caution to jeopardize operational effectiveness. The lessons from May 7 must not only be acknowledged—they must be institutionalized. ₹ 248
