U.S. House passes bill that could impose up to 100% tariffs on India 

For India, the most consequential part of the US House’s latest Russia sanctions legislation may not be the headline number – 100%. It is the leverage that number gives Washington. 

The US House of Representatives has passed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 by 262-159 votes. The legislation would give President Donald Trump authority to impose tariffs of up to 100% on countries buying Russian energy, with India and China among the countries most directly exposed. The bill now moves to the White House. 

Importantly, the legislation does not mean Indian goods will automatically face a 100% tariff. The provision creates presidential authority, leaving the timing, scope, and application of such tariffs to subsequent US decisions. The bill also contains room for waivers and other forms of executive discretion, perhaps driven by India’s relationship with Russian oil. 

Also read: India avoids steeper tariff, but exporters still have reasons to worry 

Oil’s well that ends well 

India imports more than 88% of the crude oil it consumes, according to The New Indian Express. Russia has become its largest supplier, with Kpler data cited by the publication showing Indian imports of Russian crude at about 2.08 million barrels per day in August, or roughly 45% of total oil imports. Russia’s share had exceeded 50% in each of the preceding two months. 

The attraction is straightforward. After Western sanctions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russian crude was increasingly sold to willing buyers at discounts. Indian refiners expanded purchases, turning Russia from a relatively peripheral supplier into a central component of India’s crude basket. Replacing that supply would therefore be considerably more complicated than simply switching suppliers on a spreadsheet. 

India could buy more crude from the Gulf, the United States, Latin America, or elsewhere. But doing so at scale would depend on availability, prices, shipping economics, refinery compatibility, and the broader state of global energy markets. The timing is particularly important: geopolitical disruptions in West Asia have already complicated global oil flows. 

That creates a difficult calculation for New Delhi. Reducing Russian purchases could lower the risk of punitive US action, while potentially raising India’s crude acquisition costs. Continuing to buy Russian oil could preserve supply flexibility and refinery economics, while increasing exposure to American trade measures. 

The ramifications 

The consequences would extend beyond oil. If Washington were to impose very high tariffs on Indian exports, sectors with substantial exposure to the US market could face a sharp deterioration in competitiveness. The precise impact would depend on which products and tariff lines were covered, and whether exemptions or negotiated arrangements emerged. 

There is also a diplomatic dimension. India and the US have spent considerable political and economic capital building a broader strategic relationship, while simultaneously negotiating trade arrangements. The new legislation gives Washington another instrument that could influence those negotiations. Analysts cited by The Indian Express have described the potential sanctions as a pressure tool as much as a mechanism for immediately stopping Russian oil purchases. 

For India, this therefore becomes a question of balancing three interests: affordable and reliable energy, access to major export markets, and strategic autonomy in foreign policy. 

New Delhi’s initial response has emphasised energy security. The Ministry of External Affairs said India remains committed to ensuring energy security for its 1.4 billion people through diversified sourcing and evolving market conditions, while also protecting its trade and economic interests. 

That points towards diversification rather than an overnight break with Moscow. India could gradually broaden its crude basket, deepen negotiations with Washington, seek exemptions, and simultaneously retain Russia as an important supplier. Such an approach would reduce concentration risk without forcing an immediate disruption to India’s energy system. 

The larger lesson is that India’s growing economic weight is bringing a more complicated form of strategic interdependence. The country now has enough scale to pursue multiple relationships at once, but those relationships increasingly collide with one another. 

The Russia oil question is becoming one such collision point. For India, the challenge will be to protect energy security without allowing energy dependence to become a vulnerability in trade diplomacy – and to preserve strategic flexibility while the costs of that flexibility rise.