In a landmark move, Bihar has become the first Indian state to implement e-voting via a mobile phone app, enabling select voters to cast their ballots remotely. On the surface, this represents a leap forward in digital democracy, convenience, and inclusion. But scratch beneath this sheen of progress, and an unsettling reality emerges: this innovation risks subverting the very ideals it seeks to strengthen.
At the core of any voting system lies trust – the certainty that votes are cast freely, privately, and tallied fairly. The Bihar State Election Commission’s e-SECBHR app, developed with C-DAC, offers registered voters – including the elderly, disabled, pregnant women, and migrant workers – a chance to vote without visiting polling booths. Yet this very convenience harbours potent risks.
First, the erosion of voter secrecy. Unlike voting booths, where oversight is stringent, e-voting from home exposes voters to familial, social, and political coercion. Women, in particular, face an environment where patriarchal influence could dictate choices. Similarly, elderly or digitally illiterate voters may hand over their phones to younger family members to navigate the app, ceding their right to a free vote.
Second, digital exclusion remains a stark reality. India’s digital divide is pronounced, and Bihar – with one of the lowest internet and smartphone penetration rates in the country – risks excluding voters without devices, reliable connectivity, or digital literacy. The system permits voting via the website for those without smartphones, but this still assumes device access and operational know-how, especially when the app is only available on Android.
Third, technical vulnerabilities abound. While blockchain integration, facial recognition, and audit trails promise tamper-proof security, India has witnessed repeated lapses in digital integrity – from Aadhaar data leaks to unsecured government apps. The e-SECBHR app’s privacy policy is riddled with concerning clauses. It collects Personally Identifiable Information (PII) such as Voter ID, phone number, and other identifiers, and reserves the right to use this for “analytical and research purposes,” extending beyond its voting mandate. Moreover, it disclaims liability for unauthorised access outside its “reasonable control,” effectively absolving itself in the event of a breach.
Fourth, the risk of voter impersonation is real. If a voter’s phone and OTP are accessed by someone else, a vote can easily be cast fraudulently, undermining the foundational democratic principle of “one person, one vote.”
Fifth, legislative clarity is absent. The Telangana experiment in 2020 was shelved due to a lack of enabling legislative provisions. Bihar’s rollout precedes robust legal frameworks governing e-voting, data security, and audit transparency. Questions arise: How will votes be verified if disputes emerge? What legal recourse exists if digital votes are contested? The opacity surrounding these aspects could fuel litigation and erode electoral legitimacy.
Sixth, there is no mention of data retention periods in the app’s policy. Election-related sensitive information must typically be deleted within 45 days. Indefinite data storage raises surveillance concerns, potentially enabling profiling or behavioural analysis of voter cohorts. In a nation lacking a robust digital privacy ecosystem – despite the passage of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act in 2023 – such moves remain fraught.
Seventh, the philosophical question of democratic participation arises. KC Suri, former Political Science professor at the University of Hyderabad, rightly observes that while e-voting enhances access, it risks enabling data tampering and manipulation. Democracy’s legitimacy derives not merely from convenience or turnout numbers but from the integrity, secrecy, and freedom of the electoral process.
Finally, the silent hazard of normalising techno-solutionism must be acknowledged. In a country where electoral fraud has historically involved booth capturing, impersonation, and intimidation, digital voting risks shifting fraud online. Hacking, malware, or ransomware attacks targeting electoral infrastructure could compromise thousands of votes in seconds. The consequences of a cyberattack on electoral integrity are profound – potentially delegitimising governance itself.
The idea of enabling disabled, elderly, or migrant voters to participate seamlessly is noble. But noble intentions must not bulldoze systemic caution. The past attempts at e-voting in Gandhinagar (2011), Telangana (2020, 2021 mock runs), and now Bihar reveal an unprepared ecosystem where data security, digital literacy, legislative frameworks, and transparency have not kept pace with technological ambition.
Final Thoughts
Bihar’s e-voting experiment is both historic and hazardous. Until India builds robust legal safeguards, universal digital literacy, and unbreachable technical systems, such rollouts remain premature. Voting is not merely an administrative process; it is the bedrock of democratic legitimacy. Introducing untested technological interventions into this sacred space risks eroding public faith in elections. And when that faith falters, democracy itself teeters.
